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CASE COMMENTS
Antitrust and Patents: Government's Standing to
Challenge Patents in Antitrust Actions Extended
Appellees, two British drug manufacturers and distributors,
pooled their bulk and dosage form patents on the fungicide grise-
ofulvin1 and sublicensed three firms in the United States to prac-
tice the patents.2 The pooling agreement contained a restrictive
covenant which regulated the sales of griseofulvin in bulk form.
The sublicensing agreements prohibited bulk sales or resales to
third parties without the express consent of appellees. The
United States sued to enjoin compliance with the patent pool-
ing and sublicensing agreements as violations of section one of
the Sherman Act3 and sought, as further relief, mandatory bulk
form sales and compulsory licensing of the patents. In addi-
tion, the government attacked the validity of the dosage form
patents. The district court held that the restrictions on bulk
form sales of griseofulvin in the patent pooling and sublicensing
agreements were per se violations of section one and enjoined
their further use.4 However, the court denied the request for
additional relief and held that the government did not have
standing to challenge the validity of the patents since they were
not relied upon as a defense to the antitrust action. On appeal
the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling on the
patent validity issue, holding that where patents are directly in-
volved in antitrust violations and the government presents a
substantial case for relief in the form of modification of patent
rights, the government has standing to challenge the validity of
the patents even though they were not relied upon as a defense.
The case was remanded to the lower court to consider the valid-
1. The specific patents at issue were the two patents held by
appellees on the dosage form of griseofulvin, a drug administered to
humans or animals for the treatment of external fungus infections.
Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. (ICI) holds a patent which covers
"an effective amount of griseofulvin" in dosage form. Glaxo Group
Ltd. (Glaxo) holds another patent which covers the finely ground or
microsize dosage form of griseofulvin.
2. ICI sublicensed American Home Products Corp., and Glaxo
sublicensed two companies, Schering Corp. and Johnson & Johnson.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
4. United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1969).
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ity of the patents. United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S.
52 (1973).
Prior to Glaxo the government's standing to challenge a
patent's validity was restricted to situations involving either fraud
in procurement or an antitrust action in which the patent was as-
serted as a defense. Although Title 355 does not specifically
charge the government with the responsibility for challenging
invalid patents, the Attorney General as head of the Justice De-
partment has historically been held to be the protector of the
public even in the absence of statutory mandates.0 The govern-
ment's role in connection with fraudulently procured patents
was first discussed in Mowry v. Whitney7 where dicta sug-
gested that the government had standing to challenge patents
procured by fraud. However, in the government's first attempt
to cancel a fraudulently procured patent, Attorney General ex
rel. Hecker v. Rumford Chemical Works,8 the court found the
attack on the patent to be inappropriate because the Attorney
General was not the proper party to such a suit. In dicta the
5. 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
6. The power and duty of the Attorney General to institute suits
in the public interest was established in United States v. San Jacinto
Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1888), where the Court observed that:
There is no very specific statement of the general duties of the
Attorney General, but it is seen from the whole chapter re-
ferred to [presently, 28 U.S.C. §§ 501-26 (1970) ] that he has the
authority, and it is made his duty, to supervise the conduct of all
suits brought by or against the United States .... There is
no express authority vested in him to authorize suits to be
brought against the debtors of the government, or upon bonds,
or to begin criminal prosecutions, or to institute proceedings in
any of the numerous cases in which the United States is plain-
tiff; and yet he is invested with the general superintendence of
all such suits .... And notwithstanding the want of any
specific authority . . . we cannot believe that where a case ex-
ists in which this ought to be done it is not within the authority
of that officer to cause such action to be instituted and prose-
cuted.
This decision was later relied upon in Sanitary Dist. of Chicago
v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925), an action to enjoin diversion of
water from Lake Michigan. The Court held that the Attorney General
had the power to proceed "by virtue of his office." No statute was
necessary to authorize the suit.
More recently, the Court has reached similar conclusions in United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960), where the Court
upheld the right of the Attorney General to seek an injunction against
the filling of a navigable waterway, and in Wyandotte Transp.
Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967), where the Court upheld the
government's right to seek an injunction requiring removal of a sunken
barge as an obstruction to navigation in the absence of specific con-
gressional authorization.
7. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434 (1871).
8. 32 F. 608 (C.C.D.R.I. 1876).
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court strongly suggested that the government lacked any stand-
ing to file the suit. The issue reappeared in United States v.
Gunning9 where the defendants demurred to the complaint,
arguing that the government lacked any statutory authority
to challenge a patent for fraud in procurement. The Gunning
court, however, rejected the reasoning of Hecker and held that
the government could sue in equity to cancel the patent.
Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the government's standing in a series of three decisions
resulting from suits by the Justice Department against Ameri-
can Bell Telephone to set aside patents allegedly obtained by
fraud on the Patent Office. In Bell 110 the Court relied on a series
of land grant cases in holding that the government had standing
to attack invention patents as well as land patents on the ground
that they were obtained by fraud on the Patent Office. This
holding was extended in Bell II to cases where the officials "may
have erred as to their power or made mistakes in the instru-
ment."" In Bell III the Court appeared to narrow the holdings
of Bell I and II by ruling that the government could not sue to
cancel patents for mere "error of judgment on the part of
patent officials."' 2 However, Bell III did not affect the govern-
ment's standing to attack patents obtained by fraud. When a
patent is obtained by deceiving the Patent Office as to the state
of prior art or prior use or sale, the public is deprived of free
access to a product which rightly belongs in the public domain.
In United States v. United States Gypsum Co. 13 the govern-
ment's standing to challenge a patent's validity was extended
to a second situation. In Gypsum the Court held that the govern-
ment had standing to allege patent invalidity as part of an anti-
trust suit in which the patent was asserted as a defense, regard-
less of whether fraud in procurement was an issue. In arriving
at its decision, the Court avoided the necessity of specifically
overruling Bell III by carefully distinguishing the assertion of
patent invalidity in Gypsum from an attempt to cancel a patent
which Bell III had forbidden in cases lacking fraud in procure-
ment.14 However, because in most cases the collateral estoppel
9. 18 F. 511 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883).
10. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
11. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 159 U.S. 548, 555 (1895).
12. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 269 (1897).
13. 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
14. Id. at 387. In making the distinction between invalidity and
cancellation, the Court noted that:
1973]
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effect of a finding of invalidity is functionally the same as can-
cellation, this distinction is of little practical significance.",
Glaxo effectively expands the Gypsum standing concept by
eliminating a procedural barrier to the government's patent chal-
lenge in the antitrust context. Prior to Glaxo the defendant
was able to choose whether to submit his patent to challenge
by deciding whether to use it as a defense to the antitrust
complaint. After Glaxo the decision is no longer the defendant's.
The government may now elect to attack the validity of a patent
if it is sufficiently related to an antitrust violation without wait-
ing for it to be asserted as a defense.10
Unlike the situation in the instant case, most challenges to
invalid patents have occurred in private litigation. As a result,
the Court's concepts of patent policy have been developed pri-
marily in this latter context. The right of the defendant in an
infringement suit to attack the validity of the patent is well es-
tablished. 17 More recently, the Court abandoned the doctrine
established in Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research
Inc.'8 that a licensee was estopped from challenging the validity
of the patent he was licensed to practice. Cases following Haz-
The United States does not claim that the patents are invalid
because they have been employed in violation of the Sherman
Act and that a decree should issue canceling the patents; rather
the government charges that the defendants have violated the
Sherman Act because they granted licenses under patents
which in fact were invalid. If the government were to succeed
in showing that the patents were in fact invalid, such a finding
would not in itself result in a judgment for cancellation of the
patents.
15. Subsequent to Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill.
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), a patent which has been held invalid is
essentially worthless.
16. The Court in Glaxo makes no direct mention of the distinction
between invalidity and cancellation. Inasmuch as the government only
attacked the validity of the patents and did not seek cancellation, this
essentially meaningless distinction apparently survives. See note 15
supra and accompanying text.
17. The courts generally recognize that an invalid patent cannot be
infringed. Bendix Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 421 F.2d 809, 816 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970); General Mills, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co.,
378 F.2d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 1967); Zero Mfg. Co. v. Mississippi Milk
Producers Ass'n, 358 F.2d 853, 854 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 841
(1966); Ditto, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 336 F.2d 67, 69 (8th
Cir. 1964); Tinnerman Prods., Inc. v. George K. Garrett Co., 292 F.2d
137, 140 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 833 (1961). When the patent is
found to be invalid, the question of infringement becomes moot. Cf.
Flakice Corp. v. Liquid Freeze Corp., 130 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
Therefore the court must address itself to the defense of patent in-
validity before dealing with the question of infringement.
18. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
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eltine had eroded the estoppel rule by finding exceptions to it
while emphasizing the overriding importance of competition in
ideas which do not merit patent protection.' 9 Finally, the Court
specifically overruled Hazeitine in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,20 a deci-
sion which expressed the Court's broader concern with the im-
pact of patent policy on competition. 21 The public interest in
competition recognized in these decisions was viewed by the
Court in Glaxo as "sufficient authority for permitting the Gov-
ernment to raise and litigate the validity of the ICI-Glaxo pa-
tents in this antitrust case."22
By making an additional group of patents susceptible to
challenge, Glaxo reaffirms the public interest in freeing the econ-
omy from invalid patents and facilitates the implementation of
this goal This effect is especially important in those cases where
reliance on private litigation alone to monitor the Patent Office
may preclude challenges to patents involving products that do
not warrant the financial risks of protracted litigation.23  The
19. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
The estoppel rule had originally been established in Kinsman v. Park-
hurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1856), but had been eroded in a similar
manner by subsequent cases until reaffirmed in Hazeltine.
20. 395 U.S. 653, 671 (1969).
21. The policies underlying both antitrust and patent law are
based on a desire to reap economic benefits for society through the
promotion of competition. United States v. Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61
F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1945). While antitrust law works to promote
competition by eliminating unreasonable restraints on interstate com-
merce thereby affording more people an opportunity to supply goods
and services, patent law encourages competition in the arts and sciences
by providing incentive to invent and develop new products and proc-
esses. This latter function is accomplished by granting a 17-year
monopoly to the patentee after he has complied with the requirements
of Title 35. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Cherm Corp.,
382 U.S. 172 (1965). Because such grants work as an exception to the
general rule against monopolies, the courts do not recognize patents that
are not warranted by strict compliance with Title 35 and the policies
which underlie it. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
This bias is reinforced by the fact that a patent can create a residue of
market power in the patentee which affects its industry long after the
monopoly grant has expired. The problem is aggravated by ad-
ministrative policies which favor granting of patents. A Reconsideration
of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative Law, 55 Hv. L.
Rxv. 950 (1942). In fact, this is due to the Patent Office's inability to
adequately research each patent because of budgetary constraints. See
note 44 infra.
22. 410 U.S. at 58 (1973).
23. Glaxo serves as a good example of this type of case. Although
the sales total of griseofulvin in the United States for 1956-1967 was well
above 15 million dollars, this was not adequate to induce the lower
priced generic or private label drug houses to challenge either the
19731
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case also demonstrates the importance of a civil antitrust suit
which results in a more competitive market structure. As was
stated in International Salt Co. v. United States:24
In an equity suit, the end to be served is not punishment of past
transgression, nor is it merely to end specific illegal practices.
A public interest served by such civil suits is that they effec-
tively pry open to competition a market that has been closed
by defendant's illegal restraints. 25
In addition, Glaxo has the deterrent effect of encouraging com-
panies that are practicing marginally valid patents to avoid anti-
trust violations which could result in invalidation of their pat-
ents.
At the same time, however, the possibility of Glaxo having
an adverse economic effect should also be taken into account.
To some extent research and development is supported by the
ability of a firm to write off these expenses against the monop-
oly profits subsequently derived from the patent grants which
result from the research. If, as a result of Glaxo, a firm antici-
pates a decrease in the profitability of patent grants, it may re-
duce the number of marginally patentable projects which it will
undertake. To the extent that such research is eliminated, cer-
tain products will be either delayed in their development or
withdrawn from consideration entirely. In this manner, Glaxo
may actually hinder "the Progress of Science and useful Arts.""'
Although on balance the decision in Glaxo finds strong sup-
port in the policies underlying both patent and antitrust law,
there remains a definitional problem concerning the limits of the
government's standing to challenge patents. The threshold
criterion for standing pursuant to Glaxo is the existence of an
antitrust suit in which a violation has been found. To satisfy
the second criterion of providing "the appropriate predicate" 27
trade arrangements or the validity of the dosage patents. However, the
savings to consumers could have been substantial if generic houses had
been in competition with the brand name licensees. As Harold Snyder,
President of Biocraft Laboratories, Inc., pointed out in his affidavit of
Dec. 14, 1970, "in order to induce the retail druggist to carry a generic
product of this type, he [the wholesale dealer] would have to quote the
druggist a price no more than two-thirds of the price of the equivalent
brand-name product." Appendix of Brief for Appellant at 220, United
States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52 (1973). This allows the drug-
gist to make as much or more profit from the generically labeled prod-
uct while at the same time passing enough of a savings along to the
customer to induce the purchase.
24. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
25. Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Of course, this primary goal of patent
policy assumes patent validity.
27. 410 U.S. at 60.
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for a consideration of its challenge to the validity of a patent,
the government must present a substantial case for further relief
which usually takes the form of a demand for patent modifica-
tion such as mandatory sales or licensing.2 8 However, other than
denying that the government now has "a roving commission to
question the validity of any patent lurking in the background of
an antitrust case, '2 9 the Court failed to define precisely the role
which the patent must play in the violation to render it suscep-
tible to challenge. Hence this role is subject to at least two dis-
tinct interpretations.
The first interpretation is that the patent must be the sine
qua non of the violation. In stating that the patents "gave the
appellees the economic leverage with which to insist upon and
enforce bulk-sales restrictions imposed on the licensees"3 and
were "intimately associated with and contributed to effectua-
ting"31 the violation, the Court found what could be termed a
direct relationship between the patents and the violation. The
Court thus appeared to have established the second criterion
as the equivalent of an antitrust violation involving patent mis-
use. A patent is misused whenever the patentee or his licensee
extends the patent monopoly beyond the scope permitted by the
Constitution and the Congress. 32 The test for patent misuse as
established in United States Plywood Corp. v. General Plywood
Corp. is whether the patent "is being employed for leverage to
sell either other patents or other unpatented goods and services." 3
The Court's focus in Glaxo on the use of the patents for economic
leverage indicates that it viewed the violation as involving patent
misuse. Yet no specific mention was made of this concept. In-
stead, when the Court defined the second criterion, it relied on
a series of cases which, although arguably involving patent mis-
use, have only a government request for patent modification in
common.34 Nevertheless, Glaxo can be interpreted as allowing
28. As used in this context "patent modification" indicates a
change in the patentee's rights with respect to the patent, not a change
in the patent itself.
29. 410 U.S. at 59.
30. Id. at 60-61.
31. Id. at 62.
32. Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
33. 370 F.2d 500, 507 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820
(1967).
34. Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952); United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 (1950); International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Hartford-Empire Co. v.
United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
1973]
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a patent challenge only if the violation would not have occurred
"but for" the patent.
A second and broader interpretation of Glaxo is, however,
possible. By relating the government's standing to challenge pat-
ents to the presentation of a substantial case for patent modi-
fication, the Court left open the possibility of a patent challenge
where invalidation would result in increased competition in the
relevant market even though the patent is not the direct cause
of the violation. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp."
may serve as an example of such a situation. There the court
found defendants guilty of violating section two of the Sher-
man Act 36 and ordered mandatory licensing of United's patents.
United's market control was found to be due to three factors:
its original constitution, its superior product and, most impor-
tantly, its leasing arrangements and other business practices.3 7
Thus, no patent misuse was involved because United's market
control was found not to be the result of its patents. As the
court specifically noted, "[United] is being required to reduce
the monopoly power it has, not as a result of patents, but as a
result of business practices."38  Nevertheless, patent modifica-
tion in the form of reasonable royalty licensing of the patents
to other shoe machinery manufacturers and suppliers was or-
dered. It can be argued, of course, that the patents in such a
situation are merely "lurking in the background" of the anti-
trust violation and are thus not susceptible to challenge. 9 Yet
in light of the Court's reliance in Glaxo on patent modification
cases, 40 the possibility remains that a more attenuated relation-
ship between the patents and the violation is sufficient to meet
the second criterion.
Thus, future courts are apparently left with a choice be-
tween at least two distinct interpretations in determining when
a patent is amendable to challenge. It is clear, however, that the
policy of freeing the economy from invalid patents recognized
in Glaxo4 l favors the broader interpretation of a patent's neces-
sary relation to the violation. By allowing the government
35. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S.
521 (1954).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
37. 110 F. Supp. at 297.
38. Id. at 351. See generally C. KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED
SHOE MACHINERY CORP.: AN ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRusT
CASE (1956).
39. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
40. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
41. 410 U.S. at 57-58. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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to present only a substantial case for patent modification without
showing the patent to be the direct cause of the violation, this
interpretation supports an expanded scope of the government's
standing to challenge patents and thereby more effectively pro-
motes the recognized public interest.
If the United States is to continue to rely on a free market
economy to reach its economic goals, it will be necessary to vig-
orously implement the policies which underlie our antitrust
laws. "[T]he strong federal policy favoring free competition in
ideas which do not merit patent protection" is one of the most
important of these policies.42 Congress considered patent re-
form in its last session but has not yet acted.43 If Congress takes
the initiative to pass and adequately fund the needed reforms, 44
the Court may not need to further extend the government's
standing to challenge patents because a comprehensive reform
should result in the issuance of patents which more closely ap-
proximate the courts' standard of patentability." Until such
time, however, the courts should recognize that even without
a specific congressional mandate the government has standing
to protect the public interest expressed in the existing laws
against unwarranted restraints of trade.40
42. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969).
43. S.1321, 93d Cong., lst Sess. (1973). See note 44 infra.
44. Like any other administrative agency, the Patent Office is
limited in its ability to perform its functions by the funding Congress
appropriates. Presently, approximately 90,000-100,000 patent applica-
tions are filed each year. In order to keep the backlog of applications
from growing, the Patent Office must process an equal number of appli-
cations. As Senator Hart observed recently when he introduced his
patent reform bill, "[u]nder the present system, the average patent re-
ceives a total of about 15 hours of review." 119 Cong. Rec. S5378-79
(daily ed. Mar. 22, 1973). A look at the patent mortality rate in the
courts indicates that substantially more time should be spent in exam-
ining applications. See note 45 infra. Much of this additional time
would be spent to more carefully discover the state of pertinent prior
art which bears on the uniqueness of the applicant's product.
45. The Patent Office is presently issuing many patents that the
courts are unwilling to uphold. A recently published study of patents
in the Circuit Courts of Appeal and Court of Claims by Horn and Ep-
stein revealed that less than 40 percent of the patents litigated in those
courts from 1961-1970 were upheld. Horn & Epstein, Federal Courts'
View of Patents-A Different View, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 134 (1973).
46. A contrary conclusion can be based on the supposed superior
expertise of the Patent Office in the granting of patents. See Sutton,
Glaxo: The New Role for the Justice Department, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y
478 (1973). Apart from policy considerations, such a conclusion ignores
the Patent Office's apparent inability to adequately research patent ap-
plications as demonstrated by the courts' unwillingness to uphold many
patents. See notes 44 and 45 supra.
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Copyrights: States Allowed to Protect Works
Not Copyrightable Under Federal Law
Appellants Goldstein, Koven and Koven pleaded nolo con-
tendere to 10 counts of violating California Penal Code section
653h which prohibits the unauthorized duplication of sound re-
cordings for commercial purposes.1 On appeal they challenged
the validity of the California statute2 as being in conflict with
both the copyright clause of the Constitution 3 and the Federal
Copyright Act.4  The Appellate Department of the Superior
1. Appellants Goldstein, Koven and Koven engaged in the unau-
thorized duplication of recorded performances of major musical artists,
a practice commonly referred to as "record piracy." Appellants pur-
chased single phonograph records or tapes of popular performances from
retail distributors. The phonograph records or tapes were then used to
manufacture duplicates on blank tapes for distribution and sale.
Since appellants had a minimum initial investment and low recording
costs, their tapes sold for less than the authorized sound recordings.
The economics of the recording industry are such that the authorized
manufacturers of a sound recording undergo a substantial initial invest-
ment. For example, in Tape Indus. Ass'n of America v. Younger,
316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Calif. 1970), the controller of Warner Bros.
Records testified that financial arrangements for the album "The
Association" cost $71,000 which included musicians' and arrangers' sal-
aries and studio charges. In addition, $88,000 was paid to the perform-
ing artists as well as $12,000 to the American Federation of Musicians
Pension and Trust Fund. Record pirates do not incur any of these costs.
As a result of this cost differential, the pirates in Capitol Records v.
Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553, (Sup. Ct.
1964), were able to duplicate Beatles records and sell the pirated re-
cordings for $2.99 while the authorized recordings sold for $3.98.
2. California Penal Code section 653h provides that the unauthor-
ized direct transference of sounds from one phonograph record or tape to
blank phonograph records or tapes for commercial sale is a misdemeanor.
The pertinent portion of section 653h provides:
(a) Every person is guilty of a misdemeanor who:(1) Knowingly and willfully transfers or causes to be
transferred any sounds recorded on a phonograph record,
. . . tape,. . . or other article on which sounds are recorded,
with intent to sell or cause to be sold .... such article on
which such sounds are so transferred, without the consent
of the owner.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (West 1968).
3. The copyright clause provides protection to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970). Goldstein discusses action of al-
leged record piracy arising prior to the adoption of the Sound Recording
Amendment, section 5(n) of the Copyright Act. The question remained
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Court of California upheld the validity of the statute. After
granting certiorari the United States Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that since neither the copyright clause of the United
States Constitution nor the 1909 Federal Copyright Act estab-
lished exclusive federal jurisdiction to grant copyright protec-
tion, states could exercise their residual power to protect sound
recordings from record piracy. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546 (1973).
Since the copyright clause of the Constitution does not ex-
pressly grant exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government to
"promote the progress of Science and useful Arts,"5 concurrent
state and federal jurisdiction may be inferred.6 In implementing
the constitutional mandate in the Copyright Act of 1909, Congress
did not clearly indicate whether the Act was intended to pre-
empt state action. However, the legislative history of the Act
does not support federal preemption. 7 Although sections 4 and
5 of the Act are ambiguous as to whether the states can protect
categories of works not listed in section 5,8 section 2 of the Act
whether states could prohibit duplication of other works not specifi-
cally enumerated in section 5.
5. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cL 8.
6. This presumption is consonant with the rationale enunciated
by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist Paper No. 32 in construing the
scope of state power. He stated:
[N]otwithstanding the affirmative grants of general authori-
ties, there has been the most pointed care in those cases where
it was deemed improper that the like authorities should reside
in the State to insert negative clauses prohibiting the exercise
of them by the States.
THE FEDERALisT No. 32, at 210 (Arlington ed. 1966) (A. Hamilton). This
rationale also seems to underlie the Court's construction of the copy-
right clause. See also Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
7. For a detailed discussion and analysis of the legislative history
of the Copyright Act, see STAFF OF SENATE CoAnvrEE ON TaE JUDICIARY,
86th Cong., 2d Sess., THE UNAUTHORIZED DUPLICATION OF SOUND REcoRD-
INGS, Study No. 26 (Comn. Print 1961) [hereinafter Study No. 26].
8. Section 4 provides: "The works for which copyright may be
secured under this title shall include all the writings of an author."
17 U.S.C. § 4 (1970). Prior to the Sound Recording Amendment, section
5 provided:
The application for registration shall specify to which of the
following classes the work in which copyright is claimed be-
longs:(a) Books...
(b) ...(m) Motion pictures other than photoplays.
The above specification shall not be held to limit the subject
matter of copyright as defined in section 4 of this title....
17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970) (emphasis added). Thus sections 4 and 5 did not
indicate on their face whether Congress intended the enumeration of
classes of copyrightable works in section 5 to be exclusive. However,
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Register of Copyright pur-
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supports the concurrent state and federal jurisdiction by con-
ferring exclusive jurisdiction on the states to protect unpub-
lished works at "common law or in equity."9
Since sound recordings were not included in section 5 un-
til the adoption of section 5 (n) as part of the Sound Recording
Amendment of 1971,10 state and federal courts characterized
them as being unpublished works protectible at common law.
In order to justify the invocation of the state common law of
copyright" or the common law unfair competition doctrine of
misappropriation 2 to protect sound recordings from record
piracy, courts concluded that sound recordings were not "copies"
of copyrighted musical compositions" and therefore constituted
suant to section 207 of the Copyright Act limit claims to copyright to
the specific categories listed in section 5. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.3. Since
sound recordings could not be characterized to fit into any of the 13
classes of writings, there was a question as to whether they were
subject to federal protection.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 5(n) (Supp. I, 1972), amending 17 U.S.C. § 5
(1970).
11. A state common law copyright was available if a work met
three conditions: (1) the expression of the work must be developed
beyond the point of merely an abstract idea; (2) the work must be
original with the author; and (3) the work must be unpublished. For
an analysis of state common law copyright, see 1 NImnm, ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 11.2 (1973 ed.).
12. An action for unfair competition was used to obtain civil reme-
dies. Traditionally, three elements had to be established: (1) the plain-
tiff and the defendant must be engaged in competition with each other;
(2) the defendant must have appropriated the plaintiff's product by ac-
quiring the plaintiff's investment of skill, time and money which was
embodied in it; and (3) the defendant must have fraudulently misrep-
resented that the appropriated product was the plaintiff's and thereby
caused confusion as to its source.
However, in International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215 (1918), the Supreme Court held that only misappropriation was
necessary to assert a cause of action for unfair competition. The Court
implied that misappropriation would include both the fraudulent mis-
representation of an appropriated work as the plaintiff's, as well as the
wrongful acquisition of the plaintiff's work for sale and distribution
without regard to the original source. The doctrine of misappropriation
was first applied to sound recordings in Metropolitan Opera Ass'n
v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Co., 199 Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483
(Sup. Ct. 1950), to enjoin piracy of operatic performances of the Metro-
politan Opera by Wagner-Nichols Recorder Co. The Court held that
Wagner-Nichols had misappropriated the investment of Capitol Rec-
ords which had a contract to record opera performances of the Metro-
politan Opera.
13. See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1
(1907), in which the plaintiff alleged that piano rolls were unauthorized
copies of the recorded musical composition which was copyrightable
pursuant to section 5(e) of the Copyright Act. The Supreme Court
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a category of unpublished works. Furthermore, the courts held
that the distribution and sale of sound recordings did not divest
them of their common law protection.14
However, in 1964, two companion Supreme Court cases,
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.15 and Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc.,1 6 cast doubt on the validity of state com-
mon law protection of sound recordings. Both cases involved
the duplication of inventions for which mechanical and design
patents were invalidated. The Supreme Court held that states
could not prevent "copying" of inventions that failed to meet
federal patent standards by extending state protection under
state unfair competition doctrines. The Court stated that the
failure to meet federal patent standards negated the privilege
of limited monopoly17 and allowed free public access to the pro-
ducts."' Dicta in Sears and Compco indicated that this ration-
ale also applied to uncopyrightable works.' 9 Despite this dicta,
state and lower federal courts, with one exception,2 0 did not ap-
ply the Sears and Compco doctrine to invalidate state common
law protection of sound recordings. Instead, the "copying" in
held that mechanical reproductions such as piano rolls did not consti-
tute "copies" that infringed the copyright privileges of the underlying
musical composition.
14. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d
657 (2d Cir. 1955) (a diversity action between two record companies
over the distribution rights of certain records). In Capitol Records, the
Court established that the sale of phonograph records did not constitute
a publication. See also Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327
Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937), and Aeolian Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co.,
196 F. 926 (W.D.N.Y. 1912).
15. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
16. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970). A 17-year monopoly is granted to a
patent holder.
18. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964).
19. Id. at 232. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S.
234, 237 (1964).
Many commentators have suggested that Sears and Compco pre-
sented a theory of statutory preemption over state copyright protection.
See Kurlantzick, The Constitutionality of State Law Protection of
Sound Recordings, 5 CoxK. L. REv. 204 (1972); Schrader, Sound Record-
ings: Protection Under State Law and Under the Recent Amendment
to the Copyright Code, 14 AR=. L. REv. 689 (1972); Note, The Sound
Recording Act of 1971: An End to Piracy on the High C's?, 40 Guo.
WASH. L. REv. 964 (1972).
20. International Tape Mfrs' Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F. Supp. 38
(S.D. Fla. 1972). Appellants successfully challenged the constitutionality
of the Florida penal statute, FLA. STAT. § 543.041 (1972), which is
similar to CAL. PETmA CODE § 653h (West 1968), as being in conflict with




Sears and Compco was distinguished from common law misap-
propriation. The courts held that copying was a process by which
a "substantially identical" imitation of a product was indepen-
dently developed by the copier. 21 This was contrasted to mis-
appropriation where an exact reproduction of a work was made
by the odious act of stealing the actual investment of time,
money, effort and skill embodied in the work.2 2  Underlying
this rather strained distinction was a sense of injustice. The
state and lower federal courts repeatedly maintained that the
misappropriation of sound recordings under the Sears and
Compco doctrine would sanction the theft of valuable and salable
business assets23 and would have the effect of discouraging sound
recording manufacturers from expending money to search for
and develop new sources of talent.24
Goldstein has finally clarified the status of state protection
by upholding the validity of state jurisdiction over writings not
explicitly protected by the Copyright Act. The Court concluded
that states were barred from protecting only those works spec-
ifically enumerated in section 5 of the Act. Since sound record-
ings fixed prior to February 15, 1972 were not so enumerated,
the California statute was in conflict with neither the copyright
clause nor the Federal Copyright Act.
Even after Goldstein, several problems remain with respect
to the sound recording industry. First, the Court did not discuss
the effect of state legislation which does not distinguish between
piracy of sound recordings fixed prior to the effective date of
the Sound Recordings Amendment and piracy of recordings fixed
after that date. The language of Goldstein suggests that state
prosecution of piracy of sound recordings fixed after February
21. 376 U.S. at 226.
22. For an excellent discussion of the copying-misappropriation
dichotomy, see Note, The "Copying-Misappropriation" Distinction: A
False Step in the Development of the Sears-Compco Pre-emption Doc-
trine, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1444 (1972).
23. See, e.g., Tape Indus. Ass'ns of America v. Younger, 316 F.
Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Liberty U/A, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp.,
11 N.C. App. 20, 180 S.E.2d 414 (1971); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies,
130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970).
24. See cases cited in note 23 supra. However, in areas tangen-
tial to sound recordings, the state and lower federal courts have recog-
nized the Sears and Compco doctrine as preempting state protection of
uncopyrightable works. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
DeCosta, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967) (court held CBS did not copy
plaintiff's public characterization of a Wild West personage in creating
the show "Paladin"), and Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348
(9th Cir. 1964) (community television receiving system did not appro-
priate television signals which were freely available to viewers).
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15, 1972 would interfere with the congressional intent to limit
the duration of copyright protection. Since the effect of most
state anti-piracy statutes is not explicitly limited to sound re-
cordings fixed prior to that date, they may be in conflict with the
Copyright Act. If the state statutes are invalid, only state com-
mon law will be available to prevent record piracy of recordings
fixed prior to the adoption of the Sound Recording Amendment.
Second, the question remains as to whether a sound re-
cording re-released after February 15, 1972 constitutes a record-
ing "fixed" subsequent to the effective date of the Sound Record-
ing Amendment. Although the Court did not address this issue,
presumably a re-release does not. The legislative history of the
Sound Recording Amendment clearly indicates that Congress
meant only to experiment with allowing sound recordings to be
copyrighted. As adopted, the Amendment makes federal copy-
right protection available only to records fixed prior to Janu-
ary 1, 1975 and subsequent to February 15, 1972.25 The House
Judiciary Committee Report on the bill which became the
Sound Recording Amendment states that the operative life of
the Amendment was limited so that Congress would have the op-
portunity to reconsider alternative methods for resolving the
problems of record piracy.2 6 Thus, to allow recording manufac-
turers to copyright recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972
merely by re-releasing them would frustrate the purpose of the
effective date.
Although the holding in Goldstein directly affects only the
validity of state protection of sound recordings, the broad policy
issues discussed by the Court are important to other categories
of works which are still not protected by section 5 of the Copy-
right Act. Prior to Goldstein, it was not clear whether Sears
and Compco posited a doctrine of exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion in the area of copyright law or whether it posited a narrower
theory of statutory preemption that prohibited state protection
only when state protection was in direct conflict with a specific
provision of the Federal Copyright Act.2 7 Goldstein suggests
25. Act of October 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat 391.
26. H.R. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1971).
27. International Tape Mfrs.' Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F. Supp.
38 (S.D. Fla. 1972). Most courts did not fully analyze the impact
of the Sears-Compco preemption theory. See, e.g., Tape Head Co. v. RCA
Corp., 452 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1971) (court held that the Sound Record-
ing Amendment was not retroactive and therefore did not preempt prior
state common law protection of sound recordings); Liberty U/A, Inc. v.
Eastern Tape Corp., 11 N.C. App. 20, 180 S.E.2d 414 (1971) (court upheld
prosecution of record piracy on the basis of misappropriation); Capi-
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the latter and gives some evidence as to how the Supreme Court
will approach state protection of other federally unprotected
works.
28
First, in establishing the constitutionality of state power to
grant copyright protection, the Court minimized the impact of
state protection on interstate commerce. The Court stated
that "a copyright granted by a particular state has effect
only within its boundaries. ' 29 It implied that if the effect of a
state granted copyright were so limited, the state interest in pro-
tecting a valuable industry and encouraging the dissemination
of artistic works would supersede any burden imposed on inter-
state commerce. In reaching this conclusion, the Court seemed
to rely on an analogy to state regulation of other areas of inter-
state commerce where, absent congressional action, the tradi-
tional test requires that the need for uniform national regulation
be balanced against the state's local interest: "[I]f a case falls
within an area of commerce thought to demand a uniform rule,
state action is struck down. If the activity is one of predomi-
nantly local interest, state action is sustained."80  However, in
developing this local interest test to support state granted copy-
right, the Court focused on the subject matter of the unprotected
work rather than on the nature of the industry which produced
it.s' The Court hypothesized that some categories of works would
appeal only to a limited local audience.3 2 This position disre-
gards the fact that "copyright industries" as well as the indus-
tries of unprotected works are national in character and activity. 8
Even if the manufacturing process of an unprotected work is
concentrated in one state, manufacturers will usually expect to
distribute and sell their products in a national market. Further-
more, the technical advances in mass communication and means
tol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 130 Ill. App. 2d 429, 264 N.E.2d 874 (1970)
(record piracy enjoined on the basis of misappropriation); Capitol Rec-
ords v. Erickson, 2 Cal. App. 3d 526, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1966) (in a
fact situation similar to Goldstein, the court upheld the validity of a
statutory violation using the rationale of misappropriation). Only In
International Tape Mfrs.' Ass'n v. Gerstein, supra, did the court fully
analyze the relationship between the copyright clause, the Copyright
Act and the constitutionality of state copyright protection.
28. Examples of unprotected works include choreographic works,
magnetic tapes and cable television.
29. 412 U.S. at 558.
30. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1948) (emphasis added).
31. 412 U.S. at 556-58.
32. Id.
33. 1 NnviMER, ON COpYnaGHr, § 9, at 27 (1963).
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of distribution diminish the likelihood that an unprotected
category of writing will appeal only to a local audience.
Second, the Court held that the "limited times" provision of
the copyright clause is not applicable to state action.3 4 The "lim-
ited times" provision was an attempt by the framers of the Con-
stitution to limit the possibility that a national monopoly in copy-
rightable works would be created and at the same time to limit
public access to the works in order to encourage creativity.3 5 In
construing the 'qimited times" provision to be applicable only to
federal copyright protection, the Court assumed that because
states could protect works only within their own boundaries,
state copyright protection did not have a national effect.30 How-
ever, the Court may have again overemphasized the allegedly
local character of some copyrightable works and disregarded the
fact that copyright industries are often national 3 7 Since states
are able to extend copyright protection for an unlimited time,
public access to works which would eventually have become
available under the Federal Copyright Act is permanently
denied.
In validating state jurisdiction to grant copyright protection,
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35. Congress granted the copyright holder exclusive control of the
right to "print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work
... for 28 years." 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(a), 24 (1970).
36. 412 U.S. at 556, 558. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
37. For an analysis of the impact of state regulation of copyright on
competition and the Sears-Compco doctrine, see Goldstein, The Competi-
tive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CA=I. L. REv. 873 (1971). See
generally 2 CALLMAN, UNFAm CoPPETrnoN, TRADEMARKS AND MoNoPoLIS,
§ 60 (3d ed. 1968).
The concentration ratios for the sound recording industry illustrate
the potential for domination of a large national market by a small
percentage of manufacturers of what, prior to the Sound Recording
Amendment, was an unprotected work. In 1970, the four largest sound
recording manufacturers controlled 62% of the market The eight largest
manufacturers controlled 73% of the market. The following table shows
the trend of concentrating market power from 1947 to 1970:
Total % Con- % Con- % Con- % Con-
Value trolled trolled trolled trolled
Year # Co. (Millions) 4 Largest 8 Largest 20 Largest 50 Largest
1970 •na 435.5 62 73 na na
1967 306 276.4 58 67 81 92
1966 na 218.4 71 79 na na
1963 128 180.2 69 75 85 94
1958 85 138.6 76 83 90 98
1954 135 84.7 70 80 88 na
1947 96 110.2 79 87 94 na
Data taken from the United States Bureau of Census, Annual Sur-
vey of Manufacturers, 1970, Value-of-Shipment Concentration Ratios,
M70 (AS) -9 (1972).
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the Court in Goldstein acknowledged that the states can exer-
cise jurisdiction over unprotected works with greater respon-
siveness and flexibility than the federal government. Although
the Court discussed only state statutory protection, its reasoning
inferentially validates state common law protection of federally
unprotected works. Because Congress has dealt with copyright
problems only sporadically,38 the flexibility inherent in state
common law remedies allows state courts to respond to prob-
lems arising from works that Congress did not anticipate.
However, the problems arising from congressional silence
with respect to unprotected categories of works can better be
solved by a comprehensive revision of the present copyright
act. 9 Only Congress can alleviate problems arising from di-
verse state regulations by enacting uniform legislation that would
more effectively deter piracy and thereby eliminate forum shop-
ping for lenient laws.40  But if Congress fails to revise the
Copyright Act, Goldstein will at least allow states to afford some
protection to categories of works omitted from section 5 of the
Act.
38. Congress has only amended section 5 of the Copyright Act
three times since its adoption in 1909: Once in 1912 to add section
5(1)-(m), once in 1939 to modify subsection K and once in 1971 to add
section 5 (n).
39. A general revision has been pending in Congress since 1967.
In 1971, Senator McClellan introduced S.644 which raises possible solu-
tions for unanticipated categories of works. Proposed section 102 (a)
would provide:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device
(emphasis added). This provision would alleviate the type of problem
illustrated by Goldstein.
40. Presently, at least 11 states have enacted a variety of penal
statutes which make the unauthorized manufacture or sale of sound re-
cordings a crime. Comprehensive legislation would eliminate the range
of penalties available under state statutes. See Kurlantzick, The Con-
stitutionality of State Law Protection of Sound Recordings, 5 CONN. L.
REv. 204, 297-98 (1972).
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Criminal Procedure: Supreme Court Attempts
to Clarify Limits of Entrapment Defense
Suspecting that the defendant and his confederates were en-
gaging in the illegal manufacture and distribution of narcotics,
an undercover agent for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs approached him and offered to supply him
with an essential ingredient in the manufacture of methamphe-
tamine, a controlled substance, in exchange for one-half of the
finished product. The defendant accepted the offer because the
ingredient, phenyl-2-propanone, though not illegal in itself, was
very difficult to obtain.' Although there was evidence that the
defendant had previously and subsequently manufactured meth-
amphetamine with phenyl-2-propanone obtained from other
sources, defendant was indicted and convicted of manufactur-
ing, processing, selling, and delivering methamphetamine manu-
factured with the phenyl-2-propanone supplied by the govern-
ment agent.2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment,
finding that the government's participation in the crime by
supplying the essential ingredient for the manufacture of meth-
amphetamine constituted entrapment as a matter of law.3 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, 4 holding that the ac-
tions of the government agent fell far short of violating the funda-
mental principles of due process. The Court also held that the
1. The only known use for phenyl-2-propanone is in the manu-
facture of methamphetamine. In response to the urging of the Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, many chemical distributors no longer
sell the chemical Further, it is necessary to obtain a manufacturer's
license to buy phenyl-2-propanone United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d
671, 672 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973). Many illegal manu-
facturers of methamphetamine are reluctant to buy phenyl-2-propanone
from legitimate sources for fear that the retailers, being aware of the
only use for the chemical, will inform government officials. Inter-
view with illegal drug manufacturer and dealer in New York City,
Aug., 1973.
2. See Act of July 15, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74, §§ 5, 511, 79 Stat.
226, 228, 232 (repealed 1970). The current statutory provisions govern-
ing controlled substances are found in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970).
3. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972).
4. Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in
which Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun and Powelljoined. Mr. Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion in which Mr.
Justice Brennan joined. Mr. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion
in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
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proper test for applying the entrapment defense was not satis-
fied because the facts of the case established that the defendant
was predisposed to commit the crime. United States v. Rus-
sell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
Although the concept of entrapment is ancient, it was not
mentioned in a federal criminal case until 1878,5 and was not
used to acquit a defendant in a federal prosecution until 1915.0
However, following that decision and concomitant with the im-
plementation of federal liquor and narcotics legislation, the de-
fense was increasingly asserted.7
In 1932, the Supreme Court first gave entrapment careful
consideration in Sorrells v. United States.8 The definition of
entrapment associated with Sorrells was most clearly enunciated
by Justice Roberts in his concurring opinion:
5. United States v. Whittier, 28 F. Cas. 591 (No. 16,688) (E.D.
Mo. 1878) (decoy letters recognized as a proper detection technique).
While recognized in earlier state court cases, the defense was looked
upon with disfavor. See, e.g., Comm'rs of Excise v. Backus, 29 How.
Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864), where the court stated:
[E]ven if inducements to commit crime could be assumed to
exist in this case, the allegation of the defendant would be but
the repetition of the plea as ancient as the world, and first
interposed in Paradise: "The serpent beguiled me and I did
eat." That defendant was overruled by the great Lawgiver, and
whatever estimate we may form, or whatever judgment we pass
upon the character or conduct of the tempter, this plea has
never since availed to shield crime or give indemnity to the cul-
prit, and it is safe to say that under any code of civilized, not
to say christian ethics, it never will.
6. Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915) (defend-
ant imported illegal aliens for labor at the urging of government
agents).
7. See O'Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674, 678 n.1 (7th Cir.
1931); and Annot., 86 A.L.R. 263 (1933); Annot., 66 A.L.R. 478 (1930);
Annot., 18 A.L.R. 146 (1922).
8. 287 U.S. 435 (1935). In Sorrefls, a Prohibition agent, posing as
a tourist and an old World War I army acquaintance, asked defendant
to sell him some liquor. Although Sorrells initially refused, after an
hour of talk and two more requests, he obtained some whiskey for
the agent and was arrested. The trial court held that there was no en-
trapment as a matter of law and the court of appeals affirmed. Sorrells
v. United States, 57 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1932). The Supreme Court re-
versed. A majority of five, in an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, held
that the issue should have been submitted to the jury. A minority, in
an opinion by Justice Roberts, said that there was entrapment as a
matter of law.
Prior to Sorrells, Justice Brandeis had advocated the defense in his
dissent to Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928). Brandeis stated
that:
[I]t does not follow that the court must suffer a detective-
made criminal to be punished.
This prosecution should be stopped, not because some right of
Casey's has been denied, but in order to protect the Govern-
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Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an
officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who
would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persua-
sion, or fraud of the officer.9
In the view of the majority, the focal point in determining wheth-
er the defense of entrapment should be available in a particular
case was the determination of whether the intent to commit the
crime originated in the mind of the defendant or that of a govern-
ment agent. If the defendant were predisposed to commit the
crime, he should not be allowed to raise the defense, which was
intended for the protection of an "unwary innocent" lured into
the act by an agent of the government. The minority argued that
the proper focus should be on an examination of the behavior of
the government agent rather than the defendant's predisposition.
The Court split along similar lines when it next dealt
with the question in 1958 in Sherman v. United States.'o While
the Sorrells Court had condemned improper solicitation of crim-
inal activity by a government agent,1 it had not adequately de-
fined this concept. Consequently, vague instructions to the
jury frequently resulted from the Court's suggestion that the
entrapment defense would not be available where it appeared
likely that the defendant would have committed the crime in
the absence of solicitation.12 The Sherman Court tried to clarify
the concept by stating that:
Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was "the
product of the creative activity" of law enforcement officials
[and that] .. . [tlo determine whether entrapment has been
established, a line must be drawn between the trap for the
unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal -13
However, as evidenced by Justice Harlan's later attempt to
restate the definition of entrapment in Lopez v. United States,1
4
the ambivalence inherent in the entrapment defense survived
Sherman. Justice Harlan stated that:
[B]efore the issue of entrapment can fairly be said to have
been presented in a criminal prosecution there must have been at
ment. To protect it from illegal conduct of its officers. To
preserve the purity of its courts.
Id. at 423, 425 (dissenting opinion).
9. 287 U.S. at 454. The Court concluded that entrapment exists
when the criminal design originates in the mind of the government
agents and has been implanted in the mind of an innocent defendant in
order to prosecute him. See generally Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrap-
ment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 245 (1942).
10. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
11. 287 U.S. at 448.
12. Id. at 441.
13. 356 U.S. at 372 (emphasis in original).
14. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
1973]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
least some showing of the kind of conduct by government
agents which may well have induced the accused to commit the
crime charged. 15
This test still offered a trial court no real guidance in differen-
tiating between the government agent who induced an "unwary
innocent" to commit a crime and the agent who merely provided
the "unwary criminal" the opportunity to commit the crime he
already desired to commit.16 As a result, many lower courts
continued to hold that a defendant had been entrapped when they
felt that justice had been perverted by the government's becom-
ing too enmeshed in criminal activity.
1 7
15. Id. at 434-35.
16. Abstractly, at least, the defense of entrapment as espoused by
the majorities in Sorrells and Sherman has four constituent elements or
conditions precedent to its invocation. First, the offense must be insti-
gated by a government agent. There can be no entrapment if the de-
fendant is induced to commit the crime by a private individual not
working for or with the government, no matter how reprehensible the
inducement. Second, the government agent must perform some act or
acts constituting entrapment, though the ambit of these acts has not
been established. Egregious fraud and trickery will be condemned as
entrapment. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); U.S. v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027
(7th Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Gaines, 353 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1965). Yet mere
"stealth and stratagem" will generally be condoned. Sherman v.
United States, supra at 372. Third, the inducement by the government
agent must be the direct cause of the defendant's actions. If the induce-
ment is not a sine qua non of the crime, the defendant cannot plead
entrapment. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Accardi v.
United States, 257 U.S. 168 (5th Cir. 1958). Fourth, the criminal intent
must not arise in the mind of the defendant. Sherman v. United States,
supra; Sorrells v. United States, supra; Accardi v. United States, supra;
Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942). The apparent order
in these guidelines has proven to be deceptive, their vagueness lending
them to great differences of interpretation by trial judges. The opin-
ions in Sorrells and Sherman fail to describe exactly what constitutes
sufficient entrapment, when a crime would not have been committed
but for the entrapment, or how to determine in whose mind the criminal
intent arose.
The MODEL PENAL CODE definition of entrapment is similarly am-
biguous:
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in
cooperation with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if
for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an
offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in
conduct constituting such offense by either:
(a) making knowingly false representations designed to
induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement
which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be
committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit
it.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
17. This, of course, was the position of the concurrences in Sorrells
and Sherman. See Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1973)
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The Court in Russell affirmed the view of entrapment es-
poused by the Sorrels and Sherman majorities in holding that
the entrapment defense had been improperly broadened by the
lower courts' tendency to interpret the defense as a means of
controlling excessive police conduct.18 In reaching this result,
the Court first rejected the contention that the defense of en-
trapment rests on the constitutional grounds that excessive
government involvement in criminal activity violates funda-
mental principles of due process under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 19 The Court admitted that a situation might arise
in which the particular facts would invoke a constitutional basis
for a defense of entrapment,20 but did not delineate what that
situation might be. The Court also rejected as imperfect the
analogy which the defendant attempted to draw between entrap-
ment and the exclusionary rule as it is applied to illegal searches
and seizures and confessions2 ' by pointing out that in the
case of entrapment no independent constitutional right is viol-
ated.22
In specifically declining both to broaden the non-constitu-
tional basis of entrapment and to overrule its previous state-
ments of the doctrine, the Court rejected the argument that the
controlling issue should be the type and degree of government
involvement rather than the defendant's predisposition. The
(supplying sugar, still, operator and acting as only buyer for boot-
legger); United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Calif. 1970)(sale of counterfeit money to defendant is entrapment even though the
idea originated with the defendant); United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d
903 (5th Cir. 1971) (government agent sold drugs to defendant, who
was arrested when he sold them to a second agent); United States v.
McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972) (court held that offensiveness of
police conduct can be independently measured, regardless of criminal-
ity of the defendant); United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir.
1972).
18. 411 U.S. at 435.
19. Id. at 430-31 (1973).
20. Id. at 431-32.
21. For a discussion of the exclusionary rule as applied to illegal
searches and seizures, see, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). For the application of the
rule to coerced confessions, see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
22. The Court stated:
The analogy [between the exclusionary rule and entrapment)
is imperfect in any event, for the principal reason behind the
adoption of the exclusionary rule was the Government's "failure
to observe its own laws." Mapp v. Ohio, [367 U.S.] at 659 ....
the Government's conduct here violated no independent consti-
tutional right of the respondent
411 U.S. at 430.
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Court noted that "[s]ince the defense is not of a constitutional
dimension, Congress may address itself to the question and adopt
any substantive definition of the defense that it may find de-
sirable. '23 It also pointed out that criticisms relating to the prob-
lems inherent in proving predisposition had already been raised
unsuccessfully in both Sorrells and Sherman. Furthermore, the
Court expressed concern for the needs of law enforcement and
approved government involvement in criminal activity as a legit-
imate police technique,24 especially in circumstances such as
the illegal manufacture of drugs where it is difficult to obtain
evidence by more conventional means. The Court also empha-
sized that since the defendant in Russell was able to obtain
phenyl-2-propanone both before and after being supplied by
the government agent, the government had only offered him
an opportunity to commit a crime which he would have com-
mitted anyway. 25
Justice Stewart filed a strong dissent.2 6 In it, he thoroughly
examined whether Congress, in enacting laws making certain be-
havior illegal, intended that persons entrapped in the commis-
sion of an offense should be held to be outside the purview of
the statute. He pointed out that the implied congressional in-
tent rationale did not explain why only persons entrapped by a
government agent, as opposed to a private individual, could assert
the defense and concluded that since the defense was available
only to a defendant entrapped by a government agent, the con-
duct of that agent was the only legitimate test for the defense.
23. 411 U.S. at 433 (footnote omitted).
The underlying policy basis or rationale for the entrapment defense
espoused by the majorities in Sorrells and Sherman is essentially that
Congress, in enacting the law making certain behavior illegal, did not
intend that persons entrapped into the commission of the offense should
be held to be within the purview of the statute. The Sorrells Court
stated:
Fundamentally, the question is whether the defense, if the facts
bear it out, takes the case out of the purview of the statute
because it cannot be supposed that the Congress intended that
the letter of its enactment should be used to support such a
gross perversion of its purpose.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1935).
24. 411 U.S. at 432.
25. Id. at 431-32, 436. The Court made this finding despite the ad-
mission by the government agents themselves that phenyl-2-propanone
is difficult to obtain, as well as the important fact that the indictments
dealt solely with the batch of methamphetamine made with the phenyl-
2-propanone supplied by the agent and that any methamphetamine made
prior or subsequent to that batch was not at issue in the trial.
26. Justice Douglas also dissented. His opinion presented a brief
reiteration of the minority opinions in Sorrells and Sherman.
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He further argued that focusing on the predisposition of the de-
fendant had the undesirable effect of allowing the introduction
of hearsay and other types of prejudicial evidence which would
otherwise be inadmissible. As a solution to these problems,
Stewart proposed an objective test similar to that proposed by
the minorities in Sherman and Sorrells, which made the avail-
ability of the defense rest on the conduct of the government
agent rather than on the prior conduct or mental attitude of the
defendant. It was Stewart's position that the determination of
whether the police conduct fell short of the common standard
was a question of law to be determined by the judge, not a sub-
jective question for the jury.27
Justice Stewart's objective test differs from the subjective
test of the majority in two ways: it removes the distinction be-
tween the "unwary innocent" and the "unwary criminal," and
it does not allow the introduction of evidence regarding the de-
fendant's past record and reputation. Stewart believed that the
pattern of police conduct in Russell constituted entrapment as a
matter of law since the government itself had restricted the
availability of phenyl-2-propanone, offered it to the unlicensed
defendant through its agent and then prosecuted the defendant
for producing methamphetamine, the only product for which
the phenyl-2-propanone could be used. Although the fact that
the defendant had also procured the ingredient elsewhere was
crucial to the issue of his predisposition to commit the crime,
it had little relevance under Stewart's test.
The decision in Russell adds little to the rather vague defi-
nition of entrapment which was enunciated in Sorrells and af-
firmed in Sherman. For the most part, the Court avoided dis-
cussing the policy basis for the defense by simply citing the
former cases as authority. However, it may have further re-
stricted the availability of the defense by suggesting that no
amount of inducement is excessive if a person is sufficiently pre-
disposed to commit a crime.2 8 But again the Court made no ef-
27. Justice Stewart would have reversed the decision in the court
of appeals solely on the ground that the question of entrapment had
been submitted to the jury.
28. 411 U.S. 423, 434. The Court stated:
Nor does it seem particularly desirable for the law to grant
complete immunity from prosecution to one who himself
pldnned to commit a crime, and then committed it, simply be-
cause government undercover agents subjected him to induce-
ments which might have seduced a hypothetical individual who
was not so predisposed.
411 U.S at 434.
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fort to define or delineate exactly what constituted sufficient
predisposition. Russell suggests what Sorrells and Sherman
left for interpolation: police conduct used to lure two defend-
ants into committing the same or a similar crime could make the
defense of entrapment available to one, but not to the other if
the latter had a prior criminal record, or was considered sus-
picious or possessed any of the other uncertain parameters of
predisposition.
In retaining the Sorrells and Sherman definitions of entrap-
ment, the Court again failed to set clear guidelines for the ap-
plication of the defense. By saying that the defendant would
be entitled to an acquittal if his crime were conceived of and
planned by a government agent and the defendant would not
have been involved in the criminal activity but for the trickery
and persuasiveness of the government agent, the Court failed to
define what it meant by the predisposition of the defendant to
commit a crime. If predisposition is defined to mean pre-
disposition to commit the exact crime being tried, it will be al-
most impossible to prove predisposition because the crime is
planned and conceived by the government agent in almost every
case in which entrapment is an issue. The use of past convic-
tions as evidence that the defendant was predisposed to commit
the crime which raises the entrapment defense presupposes that
evidence that a defendant once committed a crime is evidence
that he intends to commit similar crimes in the future. If the
government can establish predisposition by showing suspicion
of a past and present pattern of similar criminal activity, the
effect will be to allow into evidence materials which would be
either inadmissible or inconclusive in a trial for the suspected
crimes. If the evidence had originally been admissible and con-
clusive, it would not have been necessary to entrap the defend-
ant into the crime for which he is being tried. Furthermore,
as Justice Stewart suggests, to make predisposition an issue at
all has the effect of allowing into evidence hearsay and gossip."9
Despite instructions to the jury to consider such testimony only
in relation to entrapment, this kind of evidence invariably af-
fects the jury's determination of guilt or innocence. The minor-
ity view would alleviate this problem by considering entrap-
ment as a matter of law to be determined by the judge.
29. 411 U.S. at 443. In Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451
(1932), the Court stated: "[I]f the defendant seeks acquittal by reason
of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching in-




Furthermore, the majority's reliance on a presumed congres-
sional intent to exclude defendants who are entrapped by gov-
ernment agents from the purview of criminal statutes is not com-
pelling. First, it is difficult to read any criminal statute in a
manner which does not presume that Congress has seen fit to
make certain activities illegal, regardless of who masterminded
the crime or what the perpetrator's predisposition was. 0 Sec-
ond, reliance on congressional intent leaves open the question
of why the defense is not available to someone claiming entrap-
ment by a private individual. If Congress, in enacting federal
criminal statutes, did not intend to penalize "innocents" who
were lured into criminal activity, there is no reason to distinguish
a person entrapped by a private individual from a similar
person entrapped by a government agent.3 1 They are both
equally innocent.
The minority view, however, also raises problems in that it
is unclear what standards should be applied to determine ob-
jectionable police conduct. While the majority opinion indicated
that there could exist circumstances where the nature of the
police conduct would be determinative, it suggested a "shock
the conscience" standard similar to that in Rochin v. California.32
30. Mr. Justice Stewart stated:
I find it impossible to believe that the purpose of the defense
is to effectuate some unexpressed congressional intent to ex-
clude from its criminal statutes persons who committed a pro-
hibited act, but would not have done so except for the Govern-
ment's inducements. For as Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it, "the
only legislative intention that can with any show of reason be
extracted from the statute is the intention to make criminal
precisely the conduct in which the defendant has engaged."
Sherman v. United States, [356 U.S.] at 379.
411 U.S. at 441-42 (dissenting opinion).
31. In his dissent, Justice Stewart stated:
That he [the defendant] was induced, provoked, or tempted to
do so by government agents does not make him any more inno-
cent or any less predisposed than he would be if he had been
induced, provoked, or tempted by a private person-which of
course would not entitle him to cry "entrapment."
411 U.S. at 442 (dissenting opinion).
The MODEL PENAL CoDE expresses a similar position:
The defendant whose crime results from an entrapment is nei-
ther more reprehensible or dangerous nor more reformable or
deterrable than other defendants who are properly convicted.
Defendants who are aided, deceived, or persuaded by police of-
ficials stand in the same moral position as those who are aided,
deceived, or persuaded by other persons. It is the attempt to
deter wrongful conduct on the part of the Government that
provides justification for the defense of entrapment, not the
innocence of the defendant.
MoDEL P=AL CODE § 2.10, Comment 1, at 14-15 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
32. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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Justice Stewart suggested a standard similar to that applied
in fourth amendment cases.83 However, excessively offensive
police conduct may be no more conducive of definition than
is predisposition. But where the determination is made by the
judge, much of the danger inherent in the submission of such
questions to the jury is removed.
The Court in Russell sought to stifle a trend in the lower
courts of interpreting and expanding the entrapment defense
"in order to bar prosecutions ... for . . . 'overzealous law en-
forcement.' ,,34 However, since the Court has again failed to set
guidelines, the lower courts will probably remain divided as
to the applicability of the entrapment defense.
33. 411 U.S. at 443. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34. 411 U.S. at 435.
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Labor Law: Union Racial Discrimination:
A Liberalized Standard of Proof
Respondent Mansion House Center Management Corporation
discharged its entire staff of eight painters shortly after they had
begun to engage in union organizational activities' and subse-
quently refused to bargain with their duly designated bargaining
representative. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
excluding evidence which supported the employer's defense that
the union practiced racial discrimination in its membership
policies,2 found that the employer had violated the National La-
bor Relations Act,3 and ordered it to bargain collectively with
the union.4 Upon application by the Board to enforce its order,
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that the evi-
dence as to the union's discriminatory practices should have
been admitted. The Court denied enforcement of the bargain-
ing order, holding that the remedial machinery of the Act can-
not constitutionally be made available to a union which is un-
willing to correct past practices of racial discrimination. NLRB
v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th
Cir. 1973).
Courts have traditionally treated labor unions in a class
with other voluntary associations such as church groups and
1. The trial examiner found that two painters had been dis-
charged for allegedly defective work, one for failure to call in sick when
he missed a morning's work, and two for no specific reason. The re-
maining three were discharged shortly thereafter.
2. Mansion House (hereinafter referred to as "the employer") at-
tempted to prove that the union's jurisdictional territory (the St. Louis
metropolitan area) is 50 percent non-white, and that the only three
black members of that union (out of 375 active members) had trans-
ferred from a former Negro local when it disbanded in 1968. The
trial examiner, with whom the Board agreed, rejected the evidence,
emphasizing that there was no restriction on membership in the union's
bylaws or constitution. It felt that the evidence would have had to
establish an actual practice of racial discrimination in order to be ad-
missible.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970). The Board found that the em-
ployer violated §§ 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)
(3) and (1) (1970), by discharging its entire complement of painting
employees because of their union activity; and § 8(a) (5) of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970), by refusing to bargain with the union.
4. The Board also ordered the discharged painters reinstated with
back pay. This part of the Board's order had been enforced by the
court in a prior opinion, NLRB v. Mansion House Center Mgrnt. Corp.,
466 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1972).
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fraternal orders in that arbitrary denials of admission to mem-
bership have been regarded as private matters which could not
be interfered with by the courts.5 However, certain limitations
have been placed on this freedom. For example, a number of
limitations have been imposed by statute. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,6 recently amended to allow the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission to bring suit directly,7 pro-
vides that it is an unlawful employment practice for a labor or-
ganization to exclude any individual from membership be-
cause of race." An alternative remedy, allowing the aggrieved
party to bring suit without first resorting to administrative proc-
esses, 9 has been provided by a recent construction of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.10 It has also been suggested that a third fed-
eral statute, the National Labor Relations Act," can be con-
strued to require an exclusive bargaining representative to ad-
mit all the workers it represents into membership. 2 In addi-
5. See, e.g., Walter v. McCarvel, 309 Mass. 260, 34 N.E.2d 677
(1941); Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Ass'n, 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 A.
492 (Ch. 1890); Miller v. Ruehl, 166 Misc. 479, 2 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct.
1938); Aaron & Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Af-
fairs pt. I, 44 ILL. L. REv. 425, 426 (1949); Blumrosen, Legal Protection
Against Exclusion from Union Activities, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 21 (1961);
Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARY. L. REv.
609, 619 (1959); Hewitt, The Right to Membership in a Labor Union,
99 U. PA. L. Ruv. 919, 922, 926-28 (1951); 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations
§ 63 (1967).
6. 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (1970), as amended
(Supp. II, 1972).
7. 86 Stat. 104 (1972), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e) (5) (f) (1) (Supp. II,
1972).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e) (2) (c) (Supp. I1, 1972).
9. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Wks. of Int'l Harvester Co.,
427 F.2d 476, 487 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). The court
in Waters held, however, that there must be a "reasonable excuse" for
failing first to pursue Title VII remedies; but other courts have not
imposed such a requirement. See generally D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW 754-55 (1973). For application of this remedy to the
employment area, see Waters, supra at 483; James v. Ogilvie, 310 F.
Supp. 661, 663 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Dobbins v. Local 212, Int'l Bhd. of
Electrical Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413, 442 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
10. 14 Stat. 27 (1866), reenacted 16 Stat. 144 (1870), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1970). For a concise history of this statute, see Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-36 (1968).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
12. This argument is based on the duty of fair representation,
which the United States Supreme Court has held is imposed upon a
statutory bargaining representative by the Railway Labor Act in
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), and by the
National Labor Relations Act in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248,
255 (1944), and in Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892, rev'g
mem. 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955). Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
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tion, anti-discrimination statutes of varying effectiveness' 3 have
been enacted in many states.14
Another restriction on union membership practices has re-
345 U.S. 330 (1953). The duty of fair representation requires the statu-
tory bargaining representative of a group of employees to protect their
interests equally, whether they are union members or not. In 1962, the
Board provided another forum for enforcing this duty by holding that
a breach of the duty of fair representation was an unfair labor practice
within its jurisdiction. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), en-
forcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Although enforcement of
the Board's order in Miranda was denied, only one member of the court
felt that a breach of the duty of fair representation was not an un-
fair labor practice; the other two did not reach the issue. The Board's
position was later reaffirmed in its decision in Independent Metal
Workers Local No. 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964). Since
that time, this position has been upheld by the courts. See Locals 1367
& 1368, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n., 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), enforced,
368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Local
No. 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368
F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). Cf. Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
To date, the duty of fair representation has been used only to re-
quire equal protection of the interests of union and non-union members,
and has not been applied to compel a union to accept persons into
membership. Several commentators have argued that this doctrine
should be used to compel a union to admit blacks who have been dis-
criminatorily denied membership, however. See Cox, supra note 5, at
620; Hewitt, supra note 5, at 936-39; Jones, Equal Employment Oppor-
tunities: The Promises of the 60's-The Realities of the 70's, 2 BLACK
L.J. 5, 11 (1972); Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and
"Governmental Action", 70 YALE L.J. 345, 359 (1961). The line of rea-
soning which could be used to accomplish this is that a union which
discriminates in its membership policies continues to discriminate in
representation by not representing fairly those workers whom it has
excluded from membership, and therefore, in order to guarantee fair
representation, the statutory duty of fair representation should be in-
terpreted to require unions acting as the statutory bargaining repre-
sentative to admit black employees to membership. But see Moynahan
v. Pari-Mutuel Employees Guild, 317 F.2d 209 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 911 (1963) (holding that the duty of fair representation does
not limit a union's right to choose its members); Rosen, Law and Racial
Discrimination in Employment, in EMPLOYMENT, RACE, AND POVERTY
487-90 (A. Ross & H. HILL, eds. 1967) (a discussion of the weaknesses
of this duty).
13. See, e.g., D. BELL, supra note 9, at 751-52; Bonfield, An Institu-
tional Analysis of the Agencies Administering Fair Employment Prac-
tices Laws (pts. I-11), 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 823, 1035 (1967); Hill, Twenty
Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions, 14 BUFFALO L.
REV. 22, 23-25 (1964).
14. See D. BELL, supra note 9, at 751. In Minnesota, such a remedy
is available under MN. STAT. § 363.03 (1971), and is enforceable by the
Commissioner of Human Rights. See generally Auerbach, The 1969
Amendments to the Minnesota State Act Against Discrimination and the
Uniform Law Commissioner's Model Anti-Discrimination Act: A Com-
parative Analysis and Evaluation, 55 Mne. L. REv. 259 (1970).
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sulted from the relation between unions and the NLRB. The
United States Supreme Court has held that state action in sup-
port of private racial discrimination contravenes both the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.'
0
Although no federal court has ruled directly on the applicability
of this doctrine to Board action,'0 the Board itself has held in
Independent Metal Workers Local No. 1 (Hughes Tool Co.) 17
that constitutional restraints prevent it from aiding union racial
discrimination in any way, and that it must rescind the certifi-
cation of any union which so discriminates. The effect of this
ruling has been limited, however, since the Board has required
that an actual practice of racial discrimination be shown before
it would act under the Hughes Tool doctrine,'8 thereby virtually
15. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Although the fifth
amendment contains no equal protection clause, the fifth amendment's
due process clause has been held to forbid discrimination that is "so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." Schneider v. Rusk,
377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964). Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
In this comment, "state action" will be used in a broad sense, encom-
passing the restrictions placed on the federal government by the fifth
amendment as well as those placed on state governments by the four-
teenth amendment.
16. Several opinions, however, have indicated that constitutional
limitations would apply to Board action enforcing private racial dis-
crimination. See NLRB v. Pacific Am. Shipowners' Ass'n., 218 F.2d
913, 917 n.3 (9th Cir.) (separate opinion of Judge Pope), cert. denied,
National Union of Marine Cooks v. NLRB, 349 U.S. 930 (1955); Syres
v. Oil Workers Local 23, 223 F.2d 739, 745 (5th Cir.) (dissenting opinion
of Judge Rives), rev'd mem., 350 U.S. 892 (1955). In Todd v. Joint
Apprenticeship Comm. of Steel Workers, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1963),
remanded to be dismissed as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965), the court found that the actions of three
public agencies supported and assisted the Steelworkers' union in its
practice of racial discrimination in its membership policies in violation of
the Constitution; but because the court ordered the union, and not the
public agencies, to cease and desist from the discriminatory practices, it
would appear that the actual holding was that the union was a quasi-
governmental agency itself subject to constitutional restraints. See
Peck, Remedies for Racial Discrimination in Employment: A Com-
parative Evaluation of Forums, 46 WASH. L. Rnv. 455, 482 (1971).
17. 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1577 (1964). Cf. Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
54 (1962).
18. The trial examiner in Mansion House Center Mgmt. Corp., 190
N.L.R.B. No. 78, at 14 (1969) held:
The proof so offered fails to establish that the union excludes
non-whites from membership .... Respondent cannot make
out a case of "de facto" segregation merely on the basis of the
population division it refers to. Rather, Respondent would
have to establish that in actual practice the union has received
membership applications from blacks or other non-whites and
has rejected them on racially discriminatory grounds. Respon-
dent's offer of proof does not go this far and, obviously, such
facts will not be assumed.
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foreclosing use of this remedy. 9
In Mansion House, the Eighth Circuit extended the Hughes
Tool proscription to prohibit not only the certification of a dis-
criminatory union but also the issuance of a bargaining order at
the request of such a union.20  Of greater significance, however,
is the court's decision to require the Board to apply a more
liberal standard of proof to allegations of racial discrimination.
The standard proposed by the court is similar to the standard
used in Title VI 12 cases which consider statistical evidence or
evidence of past discriminatory practices as sufficient to form a
prima facie case of racial discrimination.2 2  Once a prima facie
Accord, Nat Harrison Associates, 177 N.L.R.B. 113, 120-21 (1969). Cf.
Sheraton Park Hotel & Motor Inn, 199 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (1972); American
Mailing Corp., 197 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (1972) (both cases deal with sex
discrimination).
19. In the eight years since the Hughes Tool Co. decision, the
Board has found proof of racial discrimination sufficient in none of the
relatively small number of cases in which the issue was raised. Supple-
mental Brief for Petitioner at 5, NLRB v. Mansion House Center Mgmt.
Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973). See also Sovern, The National Labor
Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLum. L. Rsv. 563, 596
(1962).
20. The court quickly disposed of two arguments made against
its extension of Hughes Tool. First, the union contended that section
8(b) (1) (A) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1970), which pro-
vides that "this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organiza-
tion to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or reten-
tion of membership therein," indicated a clear congressional policy in
favor of noninterference with the membership requirements of labor
unions. Such noninterference, in order to have any meaning, would
require that unions who exclude blacks from membership nevertheless
be able to use federal and administrative processes to compel an em-
ployer to bargain. The court quoted from the legislative history to
support its decision that this proviso applied only to section 8(b) (1)
(A) and had no effect on the issuance or withholding of a bargaining
order. Thus, a union which excludes blacks may not be found in vio-
lation of section 8 (b) (1) (A); however, this does not preclude the use of
other remedies against the union based on other sections of the Act.
See also Hughes Tool, 147 N.L.R.B. at 1601 (trial examiner's report);
Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 28; Sovern, supra note 19, at 583 & n.80;
Weiss, Federal Remedies for Racial Discrimination by Labor Unions,
50 GEo. L.J. 457, 471-72 (1962).
The second argument raised was that the issue of racial discrimina-
tion had been brought up by the employer in bad faith, since it had not
originally been mentioned to the union as the reason for the employer's
refusal to bargain. The court replied that constitutional limitations on
the Board's process require recognition of the charge nevertheless, but
that the Board could develop procedures to insure in the future that
such allegations are not pretextual. See Sovern, supra note 19, at 606.
21. See note 6 supra.
22. See United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d
301, 307, 311-12 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, United Transp. Union v.
United States, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973); United States v. United Bhd. of
19731
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
case is established, the party accused of the discrimination must
either rebut the evidence presented or show some affirmative con-
duct 23 which he has instituted to conform his racial policy to
the law. The court in Mansion House stated:
[S]tatistical evidence may well corroborate and establish that a
union has been guilty of racial practices in the past. In face of
such proof, passive attitudes of good faith are not sufficient to
erase the continuing stigma which may pervade a union's seg-
regated membership policies .... When evidence suggests dis-
crimination of [sic] racial imbalance the Board should in-
quire whether the union has taken the initiative to affirma-
tively undo its discriminatory practices. 24
Presumably, the Board is then required to weigh the union's
affirmative conduct against the evidence presented by the ag-
grieved party in order to reach a conclusion as to whether or
not a sufficient residue of discrimination persists so as to pre-
vent it from acting in support of that discrimination. At some
point, the union's showing of affirmative conduct will be strong
enough to overcome the statistical evidence presented against
it, and the charge of discrimination will fail unless the accusing
party has shown stronger evidence of discrimination (such
Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
851 (1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 323, 328 (8th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,
443 F.2d 544, 550-51 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Marquez
v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir. 1971); Parham
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426-27 (8th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 127-28 (8th
Cir. 1969); Comment, Civil Rights Act of 1964: Racial Discrimination and
Union Membership, 27 WASH. & LEE L. Rsv. 323 (1970).
23. The court cited Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
as supporting its conclusion that once past racial discrimination has
been shown, "passive attitudes of good faith are not sufficient." 473
F.2d at 477. Thus, being neutral is not enough; some affirmative ac-
tion to counteract the effects of past discrimination is required. Griggs,
however, dealt with a specific procedure (testing) which resulted in
perpetuation of the past discrimination.
In United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th
Cir. 1969), also cited by the court in Mansion House, the court agreed with
the government's contention that "[Title VII] casts upon those subject to
its provisions not merely the duty to follow racially neutral employ-
ment policies in the future but an obligation to correct or revise prac-
tices which would perpetuate racial discrimination." 416 F.2d at 127.
The court in Sheet Metal Workers noted that the reputation of the
local's previously discriminatory membership policies was enough to
perpetuate the past discrimination even if a neutral policy were followed
in the future. This would also appear to be true in the present case.
For a discussion of the effect of a statistical showing upon the de-
fendant in Title VII cases, see Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs
v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71
MI H. L. REV. 59, 91-93 (1972).
24. 473 F.2d at 477.
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as evidence of the kind which was required under the Board's
stricter standard).25
The Board's standard, which was rejected by the court in
Mansion House, had possibly been borrowed from cases in which
it was alleged that a union should be barred from representa-
tional rights because of a conflict of interest.2 6 A strict stand-
ard of proof was considered appropriate in these cases because
of the presence of a strong public policy favoring the free choice
of a bargaining agent2 7 which would be frustrated if the con-
flict of interest were shown. This reasoning is less dearly appli-
cable where racial discrimination is asserted to bar representa-
tional rights. Although the same policy favoring the free choice
of a bargaining agent is present, it is counterbalanced by an even
stronger constitutionally-based public policy against racial dis-
crimination.2 8 Moreover, in the conflict of interest cases, the
facts which make the union an inappropriate bargaining agent
usually are obvious and susceptible of proof by direct evidence.
Acts of racial discrimination, however, are often subtle and diffi-
25. In United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301,
307 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, United Transp. Union v. United
States, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973), evidence of continuing discrimination was
found in the parties' seniority policy which gave credit for service
rendered during the period of discrimination; in Marquez v. Omaha Dist.
Sales Office, 440 F.2d 1157, 1161-62 (8th Cir. 1971), such evidence was
found in the company's failure to give an employee the necessary ex-
perience and promotions during the period of discrimination; in Parham
v. Southwestern Bell TeL Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426-27 (8th Cir. 1970),
evidence of continuing discrimination was found in the employer's policy
of hiring new workers through the recommendations of its existing and
mostly white work force; and in United States v. Sheet Metal Workers
Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 129 (8th Cir. 1969), the evidence was found in the
union's referral system which gave priority to employees with experi-
ence gained during the discrimination period.
26. Cf. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 6, NLRB v. Mansion
House Center Mgmt. Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973). Such a conflict
of interest could occur, for example, when a union is operating a busi-
ness in direct competition with the employer.
27. There is a strong public policy favoring the free choice of a
bargaining agent by employees. This choice is not lightly to be
frustrated. There is a considerable burden on a nonconsenting
employer, in such a situation as this, to come forward with a
showing that a danger of a conflict of interest interfering with
the collective bargaining process is clear and present
NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505, 507 (1st Cir. 1968). Accord,
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 174, 178 (8th Cir.
1969); General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 516-20 (2d Cir. 1969).
28. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190-91 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United Pack-
inghouse Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1136-37 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, Farmer's Cooperative Compress v. United Packing-
house Workers Int'l Union, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
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cult to prove directly.29 If direct proof is required, many in-
jured parties or parties who will forseeably be injured by the
union's discriminatory practices will be left without a legal rem-
edy.
Adoption of the more liberal Title VII standard gives recog-
nition to the constitutional policy involved and provides a means
of reaching subtle forms of discrimination. The standard does
raise several problems, however. First, frivolous assertions of
racial discrimination under the liberalized standard may bene-
fit employers who wish to thwart or delay union organization.
An unfounded charge of racial discrimination could delay a
union's organizational drive long enough to cause it to lose mo-
mentum and fail, even if the union were finally adjudged inno-
cent of the discrimination. In response to this danger, one com-
mentator has argued that although this possibility exists, there
are already numerous ways by which an employer may delay a
union organizational campaign. In his opinion, the addition of one
more method would not add to the union's burden. 0 But since
one of the purposes of federal labor legislation is to protect the
employees' right of self-organization and designation of repre-
sentatives of their own choosing,31 the courts should attempt to
reduce rather than increase the possible means of avoiding legit-
imate unionization. A better argument supporting the more
liberal standard despite this danger is that, given the strong pub-
lic policy and constitutional implications involved, it is better to
risk some delay in unionization than to entrench a discrimina-
tory union. The Eighth Circuit has indicated that the Board
possesses authority to develop procedures to insure that the de-
fense of union racial discrimination is not raised in bad faith.""
Such safeguards, if implemented, should suffice to eliminate
most improper invocations of this defense.
A second problem raised by the court's adoption of the Title
VII standard comes from its failure to define what exactly will
29. [U]nion racism generally . . . takes subtle forms virtually
impossible of proof. Made-to-order opportunities for unprov-
able racism exist in the common union practice of conditioningjobs and job training upon satisfaction of discretionary criteria.
The skilled construction trades unions in particular impose dis-
cretionary barriers at every critical juncture in the occupa-
tional life of one aspiring to or in the trade.
Boyce, Racial Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act, 65
Nw. U.L. REv. 232, 242 (1970). Cf. Sovern, supra note 19, at 598-99.
30. See Sovern, supra note 19, at 606.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
32. 473 F.2d at 474-75. The court, however, did not indicate what
the nature of those procedures should be.
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be considered to be sufficient affirmative conduct on the part of
the union so as to rebut the presumption raised by the statistical
evidence that it does in fact discriminate. The court apparently
felt that the transfer of three blacks from a defunct Negro local
and the acceptance of a signed authorization card from another
was not enough. A related question arises when the union has
failed to rebut that presumption and has been found guilty of dis-
crimination. It is not clear from the court's opinion in Mansion
House what the union must now do in order to regain the pro-
tection of the National Labor Relations Act. Although the an-
swers to both these questions will depend to a large extent on the
facts of each particular case, some general guidelines would be
desirable. It does appear, however, that the court has put a
fairly heavy burden upon the union when it attempts to show
affirmative conduct.
Despite these difficulties, the decision in Mansion House
does effectively attack union racial discrimination by denying
unions which practice this type of discrimination the support and
protection of the National Labor Relations Act. Several writers
have gone further, however, and advocated making the union
itself subject to constitutional restraints3 3 in order to affirma-
33. See Hewitt, supra note 5, at 939; Wellington, supra note 12, at
359. But see Cox, supra note 5, at 620.
Three theories have been espoused under which a labor union could
be held subject to constitutional restraints. In the first place, unions
are clothed with a great deal of power by the Act. For example,
Board recognition of a union requires an employer to bargain with that
union to the exclusion of any other. See, e.g., North Elec. Mfg. Co.
v. NLRB, 123 F.2d 887 (6th Cir. 1941); Texarkana Bus Co. v. NLRB,
119 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1941). It strips individual employees of all
powers to deal with the employer except through the recognized union.
See, e.g., J.L Case Co. v. NRLB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Order of R-R.
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944). And
once the recognized union wins a certification election and signs a
contract with the employer, there may be a period of up to four years
during which the union is protected by the Board from divestiture of
its exclusive bargaining status. See Weiss, supra note 20, at 472.
(Since Weiss wrote, the contract bar has been extended from two to
three years, thus extending the total period of protection from three to
four years.) It is argued that this power and protection given to the
union makes it, in effect, a private government, subject to constitu-
tional limitations. See A. MILLER, PRIvATE GovERa IENTS AND THE CON-
STrITION (Occasional Paper for Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions, 1959); A. PEKELIS, LAW AD SOcIAL AcTIoN 91-128 (1950);
Hewitt, supra note 5, at 923-25, 940; Wellington, supra note 12, at 359.
A second argument is that the union, operating with the sanction of
the federal government behind it, has become an agency of the govern-
ment, performing a delegated governmental function. See Betts v.
Easely, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946); Cox, supra note 5, at 620;
Hewitt, supra note 5, at 939. Contra, Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523,
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tively require it to accept blacks into membership.3 4  Because
82 N.W.2d 315 (1957); Wellington, supra note 12, at 357-58. This is the
basis for the decisions in the "white primary" cases. Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
These cases held that a similar delegation of authority to administer
the electoral process made the private groups to whom the authority
was successively delegated subject to the state action provisions of the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. However, since these cases dealt
with the very basic right of voting, their applicability to membership in
a labor union can be questioned. Cf. Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action,
14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 22 (1961). Also, it has been argued that there is
little transferability between the concepts of state action under the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Pollak, Racial Discrimination
and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L.
REv. 1, 22 (1959). The analogy made to the "white primary" cases,
therefore, may not be valid insofar as they refer to the fifteenth amend-
ment. More in point is the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas
in Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 302 (1956), which indicated
that the constitutional limitations on state action are applicable to labor
unions as agencies of the federal government. Cf. Todd v. Joint
Apprenticeship Comm. of Steel Workers, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill.
1963), remanded to be dismissed as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965) (discussed previously in note 16,
supra). However, the majority in Black, having found no substantial
federal question presented, dismissed the writ of certiorari and thus
failed to reach the merits.
A final argument which could be made is that because of the elabo-
rate scheme of protection and regulation of this area of society, the
formerly private conduct of the labor union has become so entangled
with government policies and so impregnated with government char-
acter as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed on
state action. See Hewitt, supra note 5, at 940; Wellington, supra note
12, at 358. This was the holding in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966), which involved management of a private park by a group of
public officials, and in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715 (1961), which held that a private restaurant operated inside a
government-owned parking ramp could not constitutionally deny serv-
ice to blacks. The district court in Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83,
87-88 (S.D. Ohio 1967), suggested in dictum that because of the joint
participation between the state and certain contractors, the provisions of
the fourteenth amendment applied to both the private contractors and
the state. However, since the court ordered only the state to refrain
from acting in violation of the fourteenth amendment by entering
into contracts with contractors who hired their workers only from union
sources which discriminated against blacks, the actual decision did not
rest on a finding that the private contractors had violated the Constitu-
tion. The strength of all these precedents may be somewhat diminished
by the recent Supreme Court decision in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972), which held that the actions of a private fraternal
organization in denying service to a black guest of a member did not
violate the Constitution, despite the presence of a pervasive system of
state regulation of liquor-serving establishments.
34. This is not to say, of course, that the union could not exclude
a black or a white from membership for good cause, such as a desire on
the part of the applicant to destroy the union from within.
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other remedies were incomplete," this extension of the state ac-
tion theory might have been highly desirable at one time. How-
ever, recent developments in statutory remedies3" have made a
major innovation in constitutional law unnecessary to remedy
racial discrimination, and in several areas the courts have begun
to use these expanded statutory alternatives in place of the state
action theory.3 7 But because the closest statutory substitute
35. Despite recent amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, supra note 7, which expand the power of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to deal with racial discrimination in
this area, a more direct avenue of redress for an aggrieved party remains
desirable. Private suit under Title VII can be brought only after the
EEOC has been given an opportunity to settle the matter. Watson v.
Limbach Co., 333 F. Supp. 754, 762 (S.D. Ohio 1971). See also Besser,
Recent Developments in Equal Employment Opportunity Litigation, 22
CLEvELAm STATE L. REv. 72, 87-89 (1973). The EEOC can initiate
action only after state remedies have been pursued. EEOC v. Union
Bank, 408 F.2d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 1968). See also D. BELL, supra note 9,
at 752-55; Besser, supra at 92-94. In addition, certain records of the
Commission's endeavors to reach a conciliation are inadmissible as
evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e) (5) (b) (1972 Supp.). But cf. Besser,
supra at 97-100. Finally, there is criticism that the EEOC operates
inefficiently. See, e.g., D. BELL, supra note 9, at 754; Levine & Mont-
calmo, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Progress,
Problems, Prospects, 22 LAB. L.J. 771, 773-74 (1971).
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, supra note 10, does provide such a
direct means of suit for an aggrieved party, but it was not until 1968
that this remedy was recognized in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968). Also, as noted in the text accompanying notes 38-39
infra, this statute applies only to racial discrimination, and so another
remedy providing for immediate private suit to redress other types of
discrimination may still be desirable.
Finally, as mentioned previously, the duty of fair representation
has not yet been construed to prohibit discrimination in membership.
See note 14 supra. State statutes, though enacted in many states, are
not always effective. See note 13 supra.
36. Two major developments have recently taken away much of
the pressure for expansion of the constitutional theory. One of these is
the amendment of Title VII to allow the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to bring suit in its own right against unions (and other pri-
vate parties) who practice racial discrimination in violation of that Act.
This provides a remedy for the worker who does not have the resources
to bring suit in his own right. The second development is the resurrec-
tion of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See note 10 supra. This alternative
provides a remedy for those aggrieved parties who do not wish to first
pursue administrative remedies under Title VII.
37. This has been most evident in the housing area under section
1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982. See Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968.) In both these cases the Supreme Court appears
to have preferred the statutory solution provided by the Civil Rights Act
for issues which could easily have been covered by the state action doc-
trine. Cf. Sullivan, supra at 236.
A similar development seems to be occurring in the employment
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for such a constitutional development, the Civil Rights Act of
1866,38 is applicable only to racial discrimination,89 subjecting
the union itself to constitutional restraints may yet be desirable
to remedy other kinds of discrimination, such as discrimination
on the basis of sex 40 or the discrimination against a white male
which might result from a union nepotism policy.4 1 One result
of imposing constitutional limitations on a labor union might be
to require the union to accept all workers which it represents
into membership, 42 thereby shifting the ultimate burden of proof
in all union discrimination cases. Thus, instead of an aggrieved
worker being required to prove discrimination in order to force
his own admission into a union, the union would be required to
show good cause why the worker should not be admitted.
Mansion Hose, however, appears to have foreclosed further
development along a constitutional line in the Eighth Circuit.
area. In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Wks. of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d
476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970), a class action was
brought under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, against both the employer and the union for allegedly together
maintaining a discriminatory hiring policy. The court rejected the de-
fendants' argument that Jones should be distinguished because the
state action cases, such as Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), had
foreshadowed the use of section 1982, but that similar foreshadowing
was not present under section 1981. The court replied:
If, by foreshadowing, the defendants mean that the state action
concept has sometimes been employed in a flexible fashion to
achieve just results, the cases upon which they rely foreshadow
the demise of the requirement of state action under § 1981 as
well. Furthermore, it is mistaken to suggest that courts have
not used similar means to circumvent the requirement of state
action in the area of employment contracts. See Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 . . . (1944).
427 F.2d at 483 (emphasis added). Thus, the courts in the employ-
ment area have also perceived the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as a substi-
tute for the state action doctrine. If this interpretation is correct, it
can be expected that the same trend will be followed increasingly in
all areas covered by this statute. Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
38. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 is the only statutory alternative
which allows immediate private suit by the aggrieved party.
39. "All persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and
enforce contracts . . . and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens .... ." (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968).
40. Sex discrimination is prohibited by Title VII, but as noted
in note 35 supra, that Act does not provide for immediate private suit
by the aggrieved party.
41. None of the existing civil rights statutes would cover this sit-
uation.
42. This result could be reached by application of the due process




The court observed in dictum that "[a]lthough the union itself
is not a governmental instrumentality the National Labor Rela-
tions Board is."143 This dictum was unnecessary to support the
court's holding" and might better have been omitted so as to
leave resolution of this question to a case which clearly raised
the issue. The fact that it was included, however, may give this
case a certain added significance beyond that of the decision
alone.
On one level, therefore, the impact of the decision in Man-
sion House will be to allow the Board to tighten its procedures
for dealing with unions (and certainly employers) which dis-
criminate on the basis of race. Although the decision does not
necessarily set Board policy, 45 it does provide an opportunity for
the Board to change the standard it had been using. Given the
increasing concern with racial discrimination, it is likely that
the Board will adopt the court's view as to the standard of proof
necessary to show discrimination, thereby making a number of
sanctions more readily available. How much actual effect the
reasoning of Mansion House will have on union racial discrimin-
ation is debatable,46 but it does seem clear that it will have a
43. 473 F.2d at 473.
44. The Supreme Court case cited by the Eighth Circuit in support
of this statement does not, in fact, support that portion which says that
the union is not a "government instrumentality." In NLRB v. Nash-
Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971), the Supreme Court ruled that the National
Labor Relations Board was a "federal agency"; the case did not consider
the question of whether the union was one. The court in the present
case possibly felt that the first part of their statement in question was
obvious and needed no support. But this is not so clearly the case,
as discussed in note 33 supra.
Inclusion of this dictum can probably be explained by the court's
desire to disapprove the racial discrimination while at the same time
getting the court involved in the internal affairs of a union as little as
possible, and by the presence of an unfavorable precedent. The court
may have felt constrained by Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959),
where the Sixth Circuit refused to compel admission of a group of black
railroad firemen into membership in a railroad union which was lim-
ited to whites only by its constitution. Accord, Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis.
523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957).
Either of these objectives in including the dictum could have been
reached equally well without it, however, since simply ignoring the
issue would still have allowed the court to reach the same decision.
45. The Board could seek to obtain contrary decisions in other cir-
cuits, thereby setting the stage for possible review by the Supreme
Court due to conflict among the circuits.
46. Compare Sovern, supra note 19, at 606-08, and Herring, The
"Fair Representation Doctrine: An Effective Weapon Against Union Ra-
cial Discrimination?, 24 M. L. Rsv. 113, 162 (1964), with Wellington,
supra note 12, at 372. Most international unions, however, do not now
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significant effect at least in the case of economically weaker
unions which need the power of the Board behind them in or-
der to survive. It is noteworthy in this respect that the sanc-
tion established by this case is one which is, in effect, initiated
by the employer rather than by the National Labor Relations
Board. This may result in its more frequent use.
On another level, however, the inclusion of the dictum that a
union is not a government instrumentality may pose an obstacle
to further efforts to require exclusive bargaining representatives
to admit all the employees they represent. The expansion of
the state action doctrine to include the actions of a labor union
would be an easily available theory on which to premise the pro-
tection of groups not covered by present anti-discrimination stat-
utes, since it has received much attention from the courts
and commentators. 47 Unless distinguished,4 8 however, the dic-
tum in Mansion House would seem to foreclose this possibility,
at least in the Eighth Circuit. More importantly, it seems to
indicate a reticence on the part of the Eighth Circuit to entertain
further progress along constitutional lines. The result will prob-
ably be to stimulate activity toward establishing another theory
by which similar results can be obtained.4 9
favor discriminatory membership policies and may be prodded by this
fresh handicap to their organizational efforts to bring recalcitrant locals
into line. See Hewitt, supra note 5, at 921; Sovern, supra note 19, at 608.
47. See note 33 supra.
48. This case could be distinguished in this respect on the ground
that, despite the fact that a union is not a governmental instrumental-
ity, it can still be held subject to constitutional restraints on either the
"power theory" or the "entanglement theory," both of which are dis-
cussed in note 33 supra.
49. One likely possibility would be expansion of the duty of fair
representation to require a union to admit all the employees it repre-
sents. See note 12 supra. Such a result would probably shift the
ultimate burden of proof in denial of membership cases: Instead of
the excluded worker being required to prove discrimination, the union
would probably be required to show good cause for exclusion.
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